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Among advocates and practitioners of economic development, networks are all 
the rage.  Networks are an attractive institutional form because they are inexpensive 
(thanks to today’s lower telecommunications costs), egalitarian and inclusive (everyone 
can be an equal “member”), and hard to criticize (since most networks promise no 
measurable outputs).  Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like networks in part 
because they are not governments, and in part because so many NGOs themselves are 
built around network structures.  Even centralized and hierarchical development 
organizations have become attracted to networks, as an inexpensive way to move closer 
to their clients and customers. 
 
IFPRI, traditionally a centralized development organization, is now embracing 
networks as one institutional strategy to achieve “regional decentralization.”  Since 1999 
IFPRI has developed and operated two formal regional networks, in East Africa and 
South Asia, and additional regional networks have been envisioned for Southern Africa 
and Central America.  IFPRI is also decentralizing some of its work on a bilateral basis 
within individual countries without reliance on regional networks.  This paper 
conceptualizes, maps out, and assesses IFPRI’s various decentralization initiatives.  
 
IFPRI began its history in the 1970s and 1980s as a highly centralized institution, 
headquartered in Washington, DC, a location conveniently close to key donor and 
development institutions such as USAID and the World Bank.  When donor support for 
the core CGIAR budget began to slump badly in the 1990s, IFPRI was able to respond 
with a “2020 Vision” initiative that included more communications efforts to stimulate 
donor support.  Under a second phase of 2020 IFPRI then created a decentralized policy 
network in East Africa, and by 2002 IFPRI was operating a somewhat less decentralized 
regional network in South Asia as well, and planning other network activities.  As IFPRI 
moves to decentralize and regionalize its activities, will “regional networks” become the 
best instrument for achieving these goals?  
 
Networks can be defined as organizations that use flexible and dynamic linkages 
to connect and reconnect multiple actors into new entities intended to innovate and 
deliver non-routine products or services.  In their origin, networks can either be 
mandated (formal) or emergent (informal).  It is widely agreed that emergent or informal 
networks tend to be the most effective.  The basic building blocks of all effective 
networks are dyadic links of personal trust between pairs of individuals.  If formal or 
mandated networks manage to aggregate and mobilize these vital pre-existing links of 
personal social capital, they can be highly effective.  
 
Policy networking –– whether for research or not –– can be difficult to extend 
into low capacity regions.  It is no accident that most studies of successful transnational   6
policy networking among governments have focused either on the European Union or on 
trans-Atlantic ties between Europe and the United States.  Inadequate or uneven access to 
modern communications and information technology constrains effective long distance 
and large-scale policy networking within much of the developing world.    
 
When international policy research organizations attempt to create or sponsor 
networks in developing countries, they must take care to match network design to local 
capacity.  The weaker the local capacity, the more centralized the network must be at the 
hub.  Only if local capacity is strong will a decentralized network design become 
appropriate.  Hypothetically, we can imagine a typology of five different appropriate 
network designs matching five different levels of local capacity:  
 
•  In regions with very low capacity, it may be best not to build a regional 
network, and to rely instead on bilateral relationships with individual 
countries. 
•  In regions with low capacity, it may be appropriate to begin with a “hub-and-
spoke” network, with strong guidance from the headquarters hub and little 
emphasis placed on links between the spokes. 
•  In regions with medium capacity, a spiderweb network may be appropriate, 
with a hub that is still strong, but with greater emphasis placed on links 
between spokes. 
•  In regions with high capacity, a traffic-grid network may work best, with a 
far less dominant hub at the center and multiple alternative hubs emerging in 
the region. 
•  In regions with very high capacity, an Internet model may be appropriate, 
with no dominant hubs anywhere, and proliferating connections among all 
network members. 
 
IFPRI has been learning by trial and error to find a proper match between local 
capacity and network design.  When IFPRI tried to create an ambitious traffic grid 
network in East Africa, it encountered difficulties due to local capacity deficits.  Regional 
network efforts can struggle in Africa because of very low and uneven capacities among 
the dozens of countries on the continent, low donor support, and also for political reasons 
(sub-regional groupings of states are sometimes seen as unwelcome efforts by donors, or 
by dominant states, to “divide Africa”).  Regional and sub-regional institutions in Africa 
often have large memberships but weak secretariats, little reliable interface with each 
other, and little proven influence over the actual policies of national governments.  These 
regional institutions reflect the aspirations of many Africans to build greater continental 
integration, yet regionalization and sub-regionalization efforts in Africa have also been to 
some extent donor-driven.  Institutions and initiatives that aggregate African states give 
donors a more convenient way to manage assistance programs on the continent.  This 
kind of donor-sponsored regionalization should only be undertaken when it is convenient 
to Africans as well as donors.  
 
In Africa today, IFPRI is depending more heavily on bilateral relationships with 
key focus countries.  IFPRI’s greatest institutional challenge has always been to bridge   7
the research-to-policy gap, and the probability of bridging this gap goes up when IFPRI 
staff are outposted not to a regional network hub but closer to policy makers at the 
national level.  Working at the national level is always risky, because it can require IFPRI 
staff to make specific policy recommendations and then take at least partial responsibility 
for the outcome.  Yet in the past some of IFPRI’s highest payoff work has been 
accomplished at the national level.  
 
IFPRI has had better luck with regional networking in South Asia, where it 
created a hub-and-spoke network that proved well suited for several reasons to that 
region.  In South Asia, India’s dominating size and a strong donor interest in India have 
recently made the funding of region-wide policy work more difficult.  The hub-and-spoke 
design of IFPRI’s South Asian network has given IFPRI staff at the hub greater options 
to address this problem by cross-subsidizing activities among spokes.  
 
IFPRI’s experience thus tends to confirm the expectation that regional network 
creation will be especially difficult in low capacity regions.  Decentralization is an 
imperative for IFPRI, and networking is imperative as well, yet it is not always 
appropriate to decentralize through the creation of ambitious regional networks.  
     9
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Among advocates and practitioners of economic development, networks are all 
the rage.  Even some of the world’s poorest regions, such as Africa, are now rich with 
networks.  Africa has networks for health policy, education, gender issues, human rights 
issues, capacity building, environmental protection, science and social science research, 
and even networks for building more networks.
1  Networks are an attractive institutional 
form because they are inexpensive (thanks to today’s lower telecommunications costs), 
egalitarian and inclusive (everyone can be an equal “member”), and hard to critique 
(since most networks promise no measurable outputs).  Nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) like networks in part because they are not governments, and in part because so 
many NGOs themselves are built around network structures.  Even centralized and 
hierarchical development organizations have come to like networks, as an inexpensive 
way to move closer to their clients and customers.   
 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), traditionally a 
centralized development organization, is now embracing networks as one institutional 
strategy to achieve “regional decentralization.”  IFPRI’s April 2003 Strategy, “Toward 
Food and Nutrition Security,” spells out this decentralization objective in clear language: 
 
IFPRI recognizes the benefits of regional decentralization for its work and plans 
to have a larger proportion of IFPRI staff in Africa and Asia in particular.  In 
addition, IFPRI is increasingly engaged with regional policy and research 
networks in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the main focal regions of its 
work.  The strategy calls for further regional decentralization of IFPRI in a 
network context.  IFPRI will carefully consider the relative merits of a strong set 
of research teams at headquarters versus increased distribution in developing 
country regions (Toward Food and Nutrition Security, April 2003, p. 34). 
 
It is still a bit early to judge IFPRI’s success in using of networks to achieve 
regional decentralization.  Since 1999 IFPRI has developed and operated two formal 
regional networks, in East Africa and South Asia, and additional regional networks have 
been envisioned for Southern Africa and Central America.  IFPRI is also decentralizing 
some of its work on a bilateral basis within individual countries without reliance on 
regional networks.  Here we attempt to conceptualize and map out these various 
decentralization initiatives.  First, we offer a brief background discussion of the 
imperative felt by IFPRI to pursue regional decentralization, separating the imperative to 
decentralize from the accompanying urge to regionalize.  Second, we lay out a theoretical 
understanding of networks and how they operate.  Third, we hypothesize appropriate 
network structures for different developing-country regions based primarily on 
                                                 
1 The African Information and Communication Technology Research Network at the LINK 
Centre, the University of Witswatersrand, promotes information technology in Africa to facilitate 
networking.    10
differences in local capacity.  Then we review IFPRI’s experience to date, particularly in 
East Africa and South Asia, offering a preliminary test of these hypotheses.  We conclude 
that decentralization is indeed important for IFPRI, but regional policy networks may not 
always be the most attractive instruments for pursuing decentralization in low capacity 
regions.  
   11
 
 
2.  DECENTRALIZATION VERSUS REGIONALIZATION 
 
 
IFPRI is a donor-funded international policy research organization mandated to 
generate and share new knowledge about food and agricultural policies as a global public 
good.  IFPRI began its history in the 1970s and 1980s as a highly centralized institution, 
headquartered in Washington, DC, a location conveniently close to key donor and 
development institutions such as USAID and the World Bank.  In its infancy, IFPRI 
needed to establish credibility in the eyes of these Washington institutions by producing 
high quality research on policy themes important to donors, employing researchers with 
academic credentials up to international standards.  It was easiest for IFPRI to meet these 
demanding research quality standards by building a highly centralized headquarters-
based research staff, and IFPRI’s research reputation was quickly established.  
 
When donor support for the core CGIAR budget then began to slump badly in the 
1990s, IFPRI was able to respond with a new strategic thrust that included more 
communication efforts and a measure of regional decentralization.  In 1993, IFPRI’s 
Director General launched the “2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment 
Initiative,” an outreach effort designed to revive donor support by communicating the 
substance and urgency of international food security and rural poverty challenges in a 
format and language more readily accessible to non-specialists and non-academics.  In a 
first phase of this 2020 Vision Initiative (1993–96), IFPRI primarily targeted 
international donors and intergovernmental organizations in the OECD countries, but 
regional conferences were also organized in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to present 
2020 Vision materials more directly to developing country governments.  In a second 
phase of 2020 beginning in 1997, IFPRI began sponsoring still more local work through 




Movement at IFPRI toward regional decentralization then intensified in 2002–03, 
both before and then after the arrival of a new Director General.  In South Asia, in 
January 2002, IFPRI’s Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division (MTID) launched a new 
multidivisional South Asian Initiative (SAI), which included as one of its components a 
Policy Analysis and Advisory Network for South Asia (PAANSA) to sponsor both 
country-level and region-wide activities.  In Southern Africa, in November 2002, IFPRI 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Food, Agriculture, and Natural 
Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) to undertake joint research and 
capacity-strengthening activities in that region.  This was expected to be one of several 
new networking initiatives in Africa to be managed within IFPRI’s new Development 
Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD).  In East Africa, the original 2020 Vision 
                                                 
2 Robert L. Paarlberg, “External Impact Assessment of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision for Food, 
Agriculture, and the Environment Initiative,” Impact Assessment Discussion Paper No. 10 (Washington, 
DC: IFPRI, June 1999).   12
East Africa Network was moved into DSGD in 2003, and was substantially recast.  In 
April 2004, DSGD also outposted a Senior Research Fellow as Senior Research Advisor 
to the Secretariat of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in Pretoria, 
South Africa, to head a collaboration with NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Program (CAADP).  IFPRI also began moving toward regional or local 
policy research activities in Ethiopia, Central America, and China.  
 
IFPRI is thus deeply into a process of decentralization, often in a regional mode.  
Yet decentralization and regionalization do not have to go together.  It would be possible 
for IFPRI to regionalize its research focus without any decentralization, simply by 
reorganizing some of its headquarters research divisions around geographic regions.  
Remaining centralized at headquarters has seemed unattractive, however, given IFPRI’s 
enlarged role as a capacity-building and policy communications institute.  These are 
activities that seem best undertaken in close contact with local research communities, 
partnering institutions, and national governments.  The traditional capacity-building 
approach — bringing local researchers to IFPRI headquarters for a period of training and 
collaboration — may not strengthen local institutions and may do little to bridge local 
research-to-policy gaps.  
 
Just as it would have been possible to regionalize without decentralization, it 
might now be possible for IFPRI to decentralize without always regionalizing.
3  IFPRI 
can outpost research staff to individual client countries, building or making use of policy 
networks within those countries rather than across entire regions or sub-regions.  Indeed, 
some of IFPRI’s decentralization efforts are now moving toward this bilateral “focus 
country” model.  Taking this approach does not have to imply an abandonment of all 
regional gains.  In regions with similar political histories, cultures, or ecosystems, policy 
lessons learned in significant focus countries might be generalized to near neighbors.  
Conducting policy research in a fully regional fashion may be imperative only in a few 
areas, such river basin management, labor migration, or commercial trade.  
 
Some geographic regions are becoming undeniably more important than others to 
IFPRI.  As pointed out in IFPRI’s 2003 Strategy, broad and deep food insecurity and 
undernutrition are increasingly concentrated in just two world regions: South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  This geographic concentration of hunger problems argues strongly 
for a more local or regional focus that pays special attention to distinct conditions in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Regional or local decentralization also makes increasing sense for IFPRI because 
so many other partner and donor organizations are themselves outposting staff to regions 
and to focus countries.  As more policy research partnerships and funding sources move 
out to the field, IFPRI’s research staff can less-well afford to remain desk-bound at 
                                                 
3 The issue of governmental decentralization is usefully considered on the World Bank’s 
Decentralization website: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/index.htm.  
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headquarters.  Outposting is a way to remain close to donors and partners, not just clients 
and customers.  
 
Having agreed that IFPRI should decentralize, at times in a regional mode, we 
must still ask if “regional networks” are the best institutional instrument for achieving 
these goals.  As a research organization, IFPRI must engage in a wide range of 
demanding activities.  The policy research “cycle” at IFPRI can be understood to include 
at least nine different steps, each of which makes a different set of demands on the 
institution:  
 
•  Priority setting, 
•  project initiation and design, 
•  fundraising,  
•  budget allocation,  
•  data gathering,  
•  data analysis and write up,  
•  final review for quality,  
•  publication, and 
•  extension of published results to the intended policy audience.  
 
In order to judge how such activities might be enhanced through regional 
networking, we begin by asking in theory what the benefits of different kinds of policy 
networks might be.  
   14
 
 
3.  POLICY NETWORKS IN THEORY 
 
 
Systematic studies of networks abound (the academic field of social network 
analysis is more than 70 years old), yet studies of policy research networks are scarce.  
Most studies of formal and informal network structures continue to focus on social 
communities or on business firms, rather than on policy research institutions such as 
IFPRI (Monge and Contractor 2003).  International policy networks are now widely 
studied (Heclo 1978; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Peterson 2003), yet among these only a 
few engage primarily in policy research, as opposed to advocacy.  Wolfgang Reinicke 
lists six different functions that international policy networks can perform and only one 
of these involves policy research.
4  Reinicke points to the CGIAR as a leading example 
of an international policy network designed to develop and disseminate knowledge,
5 yet 
the CG produces far more knowledge about science than about policy.  Among the 
CGIAR centers, only IFPRI is primarily tasked with generating and disseminating policy 
research.  
 
Whatever their function, and whether global or not, networks differ significantly 
from other organizational forms.  Miles and Snow (1986) posit that three earlier 
organizational forms dominated most of the 20
th century: traditional “functional” 
organizations built around specialization and central coordination (e.g., assembly line 
manufacturing); then “multidivisional” organizations featuring centralized resource 
allocation and performance evaluation, but with divisional autonomy and less rigid 
specialization (a form pioneered by General Motors in the 1940s); and then finally 
“matrix” organizations (popular in the 1960s and 1970s) that sought to combine the best 
of both the functional and divisional models.  “Network” organizations did not begin to 
emerge as a dominant form in the Western business world until the 1990s.  Networks can 
be defined as organizations that use flexible and dynamic linkages to connect and 
reconnect multiple actors into new entities intended to innovate and deliver non-routine 
products or services.  Networks are best suited to tasks that require flexibility and 
innovation, versus routine production and the delivery of standardized products or 
services.  
 
Network organizations can be value-enhancing in several ways.  By linking 
previously disconnected actors together, they help create the trusting relationships 
(“social capital”) needed for effective human cooperation.  In addition to building or 
aggregating social capital, networks can also reduce the transactions costs of cooperation 
                                                 
4 These six are “shaping the policy agenda; facilitating the process of negotiation and setting 
international standards; helping to develop and disseminate knowledge [this comes closest to IFPRI’s 
traditional mission]; helping to create and deepen international markets; providing mechanisms for 
implementing global agreements; and building trust [something missing here, as well as closing quote 
marks] the social capital (Reinicke et al. 2000).  
5 The other two knowledge-developing GPP networks cited in the Reinicke study were the Roll 
Back Malaria (RBM) initiative and the Urban Management Programme (UMP).   15
by linking previously disconnected actors together.  Because networks can facilitate 
cooperation by mobilizing trust and reducing transactions costs, they are potentially 
useful in supporting the production of public goods and the protection of common pool 
resources.  In the specific area of research and learning, network organizations can help 
create “critical mass” by adding new members to an endeavor at low marginal cost, then 




In their origin, networks can either be mandated (formal) or emergent (informal).  
It is widely agreed that emergent or informal networks tend to be the most effective.  
Studies of formal or mandated networks show that such entities seldom add significantly 
to organizational success (Monge and Contractor 2003, p. 9), and they add the least if 
they are set up at cross-purposes with pre-existing informal networks.  In contrast to 
informal networks which evolve from the bottom up in a compositional manner, 
mandated networks tend to be created from the top-down and can thus be burdened with 
too much hierarchy.  The CGIAR, as an alliance of donors in support of 15 autonomous 
international agricultural research centers, can actually be classified as an informal 
network, since it has no secretariat of its own (secretariat and technical support are 
provided through the World Bank and the FAO) and no independent legal status 
(Reinicke et al. 2000).  The basic building blocks of all effective networks are dyadic 
links of personal trust between pairs of individuals.  If formal or mandated networks 
manage to aggregate or mobilize these vital pre-existing links of personal social capital, 
they can be highly effective (Burt 1995).  Networks with multiple functions can, of 
course, be formal and informal at the same time (“heterarchical” rather than hierarchical).  
In such networks, some functions will be managed within a formal and hierarchical 
structure (e.g., financial management), while other functions will be entrusted to 
emergent linkages among members.  
 
It is useful to distinguish between the power of a network and the location of 
power within a network.  Powerful networks will include those able to attract human and 
financial capital away from competing organizations.  In the developing world, if human 
and financial capital is not abundant, competition for human resources among nascent 
networks and other institutions can be intense, and even problematic.  Efforts by donors 
to use financial capital to mandate the creation of new networks can trigger unfortunate 
bidding wars over scarce human capital.  In societies where the local pool of trained 
human capital is still shallow, donor investments to build more human capital might 
logically precede or at least accompany investments to create still more mandated 
networks.  
 
                                                 
6 On the other hand, there is a “Law of N-Squared” in network theory which posits that mandatory 
networking can just as easily increase transactions costs, because the number of potential links in any 
network organization increases geometrically with each added network member, soon exceeding the 
communications capacity of most members.  This helps explain why the larger the network, the more likely 
it is to fall under the Iron Law of Oligarchy, an assertion that every organization will eventually tend to fall 
under the effective control of only a few people (Monge and Contractor 2003).    16
Competitive power dynamics can also emerge within a network.  The exchanges 
that take place within networks are typically positive for all, yet often more positive for 
some than for others.  It is generally posited that the greatest gains from exchange within 
any network will reside in the hands of those that provide links to others in the network 
who are not themselves directly connected.  Being a link between others not directly 
connected confers brokering power within a network (Burt 1995, p. 48), a “betweeness” 
advantage maximized when a member has large numbers of diverse links to other 
members.  The opposite condition is to be trapped in a clique with just a small number of 
links, and all to fellow clique members.  In highly centralized networks, brokering power 
tends to reside at a single center hub linked to all other members by spokes, with the 
members at the ends of those spokes poorly connected to each other.  
 
In addition to brokering advantages, resource advantages can also be a source of 
power within a network.  The network members that possess more useful information, 
more social capital, or more human and financial capital will naturally enjoy a position of 
advantage when initiating exchanges (Monge and Contractor 2003, p. 24).  These 
resource advantages will then typically evolve into a positional “betweeness” advantage 
as well, once the less well-endowed network members begin seeking exclusive dyadic 
links to the resource-rich member.  If networks are populated by members with 
dramatically unequal resources, those who are resource rich can tend to become hubs 
sooner or later.  Network organizations made up of unequally endowed members can 
display so much hierarchy as to no longer constitute a genuine network.  When working 
in developing countries where human and financial resources are not yet abundant, 
relatively well-endowed organizations such as IFPRI can find it a challenge to mandate 
the creation of genuinely equitable, non-centralized networks.  
 
Policy networking –– whether for research or not –– has been difficult to extend 
into low capacity regions.  It is no accident that most studies of successful transnational 
policy networking among governments have focused either on the European Union 
(Peterson 2003) or on trans-Atlantic ties between Europe and the United States 
(Slaughter 1997).  Slaughter’s powerful and recently popularized vision of states 
disaggregating into sub-governmental units (courts, regulatory agencies, legislatures) and 
then networking at this disaggregated level across borders, is a vision that applies well 
enough between the U.S. and the EU, or between the U.S. and Canada, but one that 
works far less well among the low capacity and more centralized governmental units 
found in developing Asia or Africa.
7  Developing-country governments find it more 
difficult to participate in transnational policy networking because contain fewer 
individual judges, regulators, or legislators with both the capacity and the autonomy 
needed to engage deeply with counterparts across borders.  When transnational 
networking takes place among government officials from developing regions, it more 
often takes place formally rather than informally, and usually at a higher (ministerial or 
even presidential) level.  IFPRI has been able to find sub-ministerial intergovernmental 
                                                 
7 Slaughter’s 2004 book-length discussion of intergovernmental networks — in her three select 
areas of information sharing, enforcement, and regulatory harmonization — is dominated by examples 
from Europe and North America (Slaughter 2004).    17
network partners among some large developing countries, such as China and India, and in 
some river basin regions where transgovernmental ties tend to form of necessity, but 
smoothly functioning international policy networks among lower level government 
officials are frequently unavailable in the developing world.
8  
 
Inadequate or uneven access to modern communications and information 
technology constrains effective long distance and large-scale policy networking within 
much of the developing world.  Donors and international NGO representatives can find it 
relatively easy to network with each other in developing-country regions, given their 
ready access to vehicles, mobile telephones, email, and the Internet, yet local government 
officials and even some university-based researchers will lack access to these facilitating 
technologies in very poor countries.  Internet-based social science research networks 
within low capacity regions in the developing world, such as the Global Development 
Network (GDN), are struggling against these digital divide realities.
9  
 
                                                 
8 It is to be hoped that the continued spread of up-to-date telecommunications systems into the 
developing world will speed the growth of effective cross-border policy networking.  Yet reduced 
telecommunications costs have not always conferred an advantage to longer range versus shorter-range 
networks.  The introduction of the telephone in the early 20
th century actually centralized many business 
networks, by facilitating the construction of high-rise buildings containing concentrated office clusters on 
multiple floors linked by phone (Pool et al. 1977).  Modern communications technologies such as e-mail 
may reduce the need to travel, yet this can paradoxically undercut long-distance networking if it reduces 
the face-to-face interactions that are still needed to build social capital within a network.  Empirical studies 
of e-mail and Internet impacts on organizational structure have so far failed to turn up consistent evidence 
of a decentralization effect (Monge and Contractor 2003, p. 231–232).  Contextual factors other than 
technology (e.g., managerial preferences) appear to dominate when determining the degree of 
centralization likely to be found within a network.  
9 The Africa Window of GDN profiles African researchers and research centers, and publicizes 
funding opportunities for African researchers, yet up through 2004 this window was run by a GDN team 
outside of the region rather than by an African team, implying weak local ownership for this network.  For 
information on GDN’s Africa Window, see http://www.gdnet.org/regional windows/.   18
 
 
4.  MATCHING NETWORK DESIGN TO LOCAL CAPACITY 
 
 
When international policy research organizations such as IFPRI attempt to create 
or sponsor networks in developing countries, they must take care to match network 
design to local capacity.  Hypothetically, this would call for the sponsorship of more 
ambitious networks in higher capacity regions, and less ambitious networks in regions 
with less capacity.  In regions with very low capacity, the attempt to sponsor a new 
policy network might even have to be delayed, pending larger investments in education, 
training, and local institutional development.  In these very low capacity regions, perhaps 
the best way for IFPRI to decentralize and localize its policy research and 
communications operations will be to postpone regional networking and begin by 
working bilaterally, country by country.  
 
The decision rule for appropriate regional network design thus might be a 
matching exercise between local capacity and network centralization.  The weaker the 
local capacity, the more centralized the network must be at the IFPRI hub.  If local 
capacity is stronger, more decentralized network designs become appropriate.  
Hypothetically, we can imagine a typology of five different appropriate network designs 
matching five different levels of local capacity (Table 1):   
 
Table 1:  Matching regional network design to local capacity 
 
Local Capacity Level  Appropriate Network Design 
Very Low  Do not rely on a regional network. Build bilateral 
relationships country by country, perhaps by out-posting staff. 
Low  Hub-and-Spoke Network: Strong hub at IFPRI headquarters 
with little emphasis placed on links between spokes. 
Medium  Spiderweb Network: Strong hub at IFPRI headquarters but 
with greater emphasis placed on links between spokes. 
High 
Traffic-Grid Network: Hub at IFPRI headquarters less 
dominant, with multiple alternative hubs developing in the 
region. 
Very High  Internet Model Network: No dominant hubs anywhere, as 
connections among all network members proliferate. 
 
Where regions have just barely the local capacity required to network, the 
appropriate starting point may be a highly centralized hub-and-spoke network, with 
multiple country team members at the ends of each spoke, but with nearly all the 
brokering and resource allocation powers still located at the IFPRI headquarters hub.  In 
regions with slightly higher capacity, IFPRI might consider moving to a slightly less 
centralized spiderweb network, where IFPRI headquarters or a local outposted IFPRI 
staff member remains the dominant hub but with more independent connections among 
the country teams and team members at the ends of the spokes.  Under this design, IFPRI   19
yields some of its brokering and resource-allocation power to network members in the 
region, at a distance from the hub.  In regions with still higher local capacity, a traffic 
grid model might become appropriate.  Regional networks built on this model would 
have multiple hubs, including hubs in the region beyond the IFPRI hub.  Some links in 
this network grid would be more heavily used than others, and the central IFPRI hub 
would still be the most visible, but there would be no single choke point in the grid to 
block local brokering options.  In regions of very high capacity –– probably not including 
any of the developing-country regions where IFPRI currently works –– a completely 
decentralized Internet-style network design might become appropriate, with informal and 
emergent networking activities eventually replacing formal and mandated activities 
completely.  
 
IFPRI’s experience with regional networks so far can provide only a preliminary 
and partial test of this probable relationship between local capacity and appropriate 
regional network design.  Lessons nonetheless can be learned.  In the brief review to 
follow we see that when IFPRI tried to create a decentralized traffic grid network in East 
Africa, it did encounter difficulties due to deficits in local capacity.  IFPRI has had better 
luck with a far less decentralized hub-and-spoke network in South Asia.  And in some 
low capacity countries in Africa today, IFPRI has begun to experiment with a more 
bilateral decentralization strategy that is not so reliant on regional networks.  
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5.  IFPRI’S NETWORK EXPERIENCE 
 
 
IFPRI has recently launched or envisioned at least three different regional 
network designs.  A traffic grid network was created in East Africa by IFPRI’s 2020 
Vision initiative in 1999.  A hub-and-spoke network was created in South Asia by MTID 
in 2002.  A partnership with a hub-and-spoke network was also briefly considered for 
Southern Africa by DSGD in 2003.
10  Of these three regional networks, one no longer 
exists in its original form (the 2020 Vision network in East Africa, now having been 
taken over by DSGD and altered) and one was never fully created (the DSGD Southern 
Africa network), so neat comparisons of network performance and output are not 
possible.  Yet even a rough comparison of these three initiatives confirms the importance 
of taking local capacity into account.  
 
In the regions of East Africa and South Asia, local human capacity to conduct 
world-class food and agricultural policy research tends to be both weak an uneven.  In 
East Africa, all six of the countries that formed IFPRI’s 2020 Vision East African 
Network are classified by UNDP as countries of “low human development.”  As Table 2 
shows, all six of these nations have human development index (HDI) rankings deep into 
the bottom fifth of all nations (rankings of 146 or higher out of 175 nations).  By 
comparison in South Asia, only two of IFPRI’s six PAANSA countries (Nepal and 
Pakistan) fall into the “low human development category,” with all six having HDI 
rankings higher than each the East African network countries.  Table 2 also provides, as a 
crude measure of local capacity to engage in high quality food and agricultural policy 
research, the numbers of researchers in each of these countries who have recently been 
members of the International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE).  Here the 
largest contrasts are within regions, with India holding far more top research capacity 
than the other South Asian countries, and with Kenya and Ethiopia showing significantly 
greater capacity than any of their East African neighbors.  The overall pattern, however, 
remains one of conspicuous weakness.  In nine of the 12 IFPRI network countries in 
these two regions, IAAE membership has averaged single digits only.  
 
Finding network structures to accommodate these weak and/or uneven local 
research capacities has been a challenge for IFPRI.  The structures that have been 
attempted so far have all been “heterarchical” in the sense that some functions have been 
more centralized than others.  We can best describe these heterarchical structures by 
recalling the nine-step policy research cycle mentioned earlier, and then mapping the 
physical location where each of these research steps takes place within each of the 
network designs attempted so far.  
 
                                                 
10 IFPRI also maintains several other regional initiatives, including a regional network on 
HIV/AIDS, Rural Livelihoods and Food Security (RENEWAL) and a collaborative Mashreq and Maghreb 
(M&M) project.   21
Table 2:  Capacity measures for IFPRI network countries 
 




East Africa (2020 Vision East Africa Network countries) 
Ethiopia 169  14 
Kenya 146  25 
Malawi  162    5 
Mozambique  170    7 
Tanzania  160    6 
Uganda  147    9 
    
South Asia (SAI/PAANSA Network countries) 
Bangladesh  139    7 
Bhutan  136    0 
India 127 34 
Nepal  143    2 
Pakistan  144    2 
Sri Lanka    99    4 
 
 
East Africa Network (2020 Vision) 
 
IFPRI’s 2020 Vision East Africa Network (EAN) operated from 1999–2003, and 
eventually included six countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and 
Uganda.  This was a “traffic grid” network with substantial decentralization, including 
significantly autonomous country team hubs within each member country.  Each country 
had access to the Network through a “country team” consisting of 8–11 nationals 
representing a variety of institutions and professions linked to food and agricultural 
policy.  In each Network country, IFPRI approached a leading researcher to manage the 
job of assembling a country team, but final country team membership was not under 
IFPRI’s control.  Each team had a Chair who was typically a senior government official, 
and a Coordinator who was usually an experienced researcher.  Modest compensation 
was paid to country team members and leaders.  The direction-setting body of the 
Network was the Regional Advisory Committee (RAC), consisting of the chairs of the 
six country teams, or their representatives, and a local Chairman from the region.  A 
widely respected senior Kenyan policy leader and a former IFPRI board member, who 
was one of the original conceptualizers of the Network initiative, served as Chairman.  
The RAC met formally once a year in various capitals in the region.  The administration 
of this Network at the regional level was the responsibility of a Network Coordinator 
                                                 
11 For purposes of comparison, there tend to be many more IAAE memberships in leading OECD 
countries: United Kingdom 68, Germany 126, Japan 91, and United States 167 (National membership 
counts provided by IAAE, 12 August 2004).  There are, however, some problems about where some 
individuals are coded for in this database, and these could not be taken into account in presenting these 
data.    22
heading a small office in Kampala.  The Network Coordinator was an African expected 
to serve the country teams and the local RAC, but the Coordinator worked for IFPRI and 
was selected by and reported to the Head of the 2020 Vision initiative at IFPRI 
headquarters in the office of the DG.  
 
The principal activity of the 2020 Vision East Africa Network was sponsorship of 
local policy research through a competitive research grants program.  The significantly 
decentralized character of the Network was visible at nearly every stage in this 
competitive grant research cycle, as shown in Table 3.  
 
Research Priority Setting 
 
In the 2020 Vision EAN, research priority setting was a locally controlled 
function, and not always effectively controlled as a consequence.  Each independent 
country team was invited to prepare a “country paper” describing its own national 
research priorities at an inaugural regional workshop in Entebbe in October 1998.  IFPRI 
leadership, including the DG, participated in this first regional meeting, but IFPRI never 
tabled a list of its own research priorities, and did not even force a consolidation of the 
numerous and diverse priorities brought forward by the country teams.  Research priority 
setting became, by default, a national country team function, and most country teams 
lapsed into setting priorities on a case by case basis, supporting good research proposals 
whether they fit a previously identified research objective or not.  This was an approach 
that made some sense for a very low capacity region, where only a handful of local 
researchers were putting forward good proposals every year.  
 
Table 3:  Allocation of Research Tasks—East Africa Network (2020 Vision) 1999–2003 
 
Research Priority Setting:  Local Country Teams 
Project Initiation and Design:  Local researchers 
Fundraising:  IFPRI HQ (2020) 
Budget Allocation:  Shared — Local RAC, Local Network 
Coordinator, IFPRI HQ (2020) 
Data Gathering:  Local researchers 
Data Analysis and Write-up:  Local researchers 
Final Review and Quality Control:  Shared — PEC, Local Network Coordinator 
Publication:  Local Network Coordinator and IFPRI HQ 
(2020) 
Extension of Published Results:  Local Country Teams, Local RAC 
 
RAC = Regional Advisory Committee  
PEC = Proposal Evaluation Committee  
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Research Project Initiation and Design 
 
The EAN was highly decentralized at this second stage of the research cycle, 
relying entirely on local African researchers to propose fundable projects.  These local 
researchers were invited (as individuals or teams) to compete for one-year grants of 
roughly $15,000 each.  Local researchers appreciated the flexibility of this approach, yet 
it also implied a certain lack of control (even by country teams) over the direction of 
research, and in the end it also fell short in generating the desired number of fundable 
projects.  IFPRI’s original goal was to disburse roughly $200,000 per year in research 
support, which would have meant awarding roughly 13 grants per year in the region.  In 
the three rounds of competition that were held (in 2000, 2001, and 2002) the EAN was 
able to elicit, on average, only 10 fundable grants per year.  
 
IFPRI’s sensible response to this shortage of strong proposals in East Africa was 
to schedule more proposal writing workshops to train local researchers, which 
transformed the initiative into one of capacity building, alongside research.  In 2002 
alone, IFPRI’s Strategic Training and Policy Communication Program conducted two-
day proposal writing workshops with local collaborators in all six Network countries, 
reaching a total of 195 participants.  Many of these researchers subsequently submitted 
proposals for Round Three of the competition, but local capacity deficits in some 
countries continued to limit the submission of high-quality proposals.  Researchers in 
Tanzania submitted only seven proposals for consideration over three years, and only two 





Fundraising to support the 2020 Vision EAN was understandably a headquarters 
function, indeed it was largely a DG function.  In August 1996, the DG approached 
DANIDA with an initial request for planning support to launch 2020 Vision networks in 
both East and West Africa, and subsequently with a 1998 request for $5 million over four 
years to fund the operational phase of these two proposed networks.  The donor response 
was sufficient to fund only the East Africa Network, but eventually DANIDA, GTZ, 




The allocation of Network funds was a function successfully shared between 
IFPRI headquarters, the RAC, and the local country teams.  It was the RAC, not the 
Network Coordinator or the DG’s Office, that effectively controlled the annual awarding 
of competitive grants.  This degree of local control was frustrating to headquarters when 
the RAC proved reluctant to terminate funding on non-performing grants.  The RAC was 
also empowered to make formal recommendations regarding the expenditure of Network 
funds for non-research activities, such as national or regional policy fora, but in these 
cases IFPRI headquarters did retain a veto.  Some country teams went directly to 
headquarters in search of non-research funding.  The Ethiopian country team secured   24
funding for two highly successful national policy forums after approaching IFPRI 
headquarters bilaterally.  Later the chair of the Malawi country team also approached 
IFPRI bilaterally seeking funding for a national policy conference, but in this case the 
proposed conference budget of $20,000 exceeded what IFPRI headquarters was willing 




Data to support research projects was gathered locally by local researchers, either 
at the national level or at the district or project level.  The small size of the EAN 
competitive grants usually implied data collection across only a narrow geographic base 
and time period.  These data limitations tended to limit aggregation to the national level, 
let alone cross-regional comparisons.  On the other hand, those EAN research efforts 
could serve as useful pilot projects for larger research efforts financed at the national 
level, and some became models followed by researchers in other network countries.  
 
Data Analysis and Write-up 
 
The EAN small grants program also left data analysis and write-up entirely in the 
hands of local researchers, a practice that contributed to a very low project completion 
rate.  In the first two Rounds of grant competition, a total of 21 research projects were 
funded, but of these 21 projects nine failed to produce a draft report.  Of the 12 research 
teams that did submit draft reports, only six were able to respond to external reviews with 
a revised draft.
12  This low completion rate reflected weak capacity among researchers in 
the region.  It also reflected some distraction among these researchers.  In East Africa, 
resources and opportunities always seem to be chasing after the same small number of 
qualified policy researchers, so rather than complete an EAN research project some 
grantees dropped their work to accept more lucrative consulting or research opportunities 
from others.  Some projects also lingered too long at the write-up phase because of 
IFPRI’s decision (deferring to the RAC) not to set a firm cut-off date to end eligibility for 
the final tranche of grant funding.  
 
Final Review and Quality Control 
 
Research projects in the original 2020 Vision EAN were screened for quality at 
three different points.  Draft proposals were first subjected to country team review and 
critique.  Revised proposals were then screened by an independent Proposal Evaluation 
Committee (PEC), made up of five senior researchers, some Africans and also some 
outsiders from academia, the donor community, the CGIAR system, the private sector, 
and private foundations.  The RAC would not approve a proposal for funding unless the 
PEC had also made a positive recommendation.  Third, at the end of a project the draft 
research results were submitted to the Network Coordinator for a final blind peer review 
by at least two outside evaluators.  The Coordinator could then impose significant 
                                                 
12 These data reflect the state of the grants program in mid-2003, when 2020 custody of the EAN 
came to an end.    25
requirements for revision upon authors prior to any IFPRI publication of the results.  The 
final external review proved too difficult a test for some researchers, as noted above.  The 
presence of a more active and supportive Network Coordinator in Kampala might have 





In the EAN 2020 Vision network model, once final research results were 
reviewed, revised, and ready for publication, all editing and production obligations were 
assumed by the Network Coordinator and the Head of 2020 in the DG’s Office.  Final 
results were published in the form of a 2020 Vision Network for East Africa Report, 
summarized as a Network policy brief, and posted on the Network website.  The sluggish 
production of final research results meant that few projects had reached this stage by the 
time the EAN was moved from the 2020 office to DSGD in 2003.  As of August 2003, 
only one final research report had been published.  
 
Extension of Published Results and Policy Communication 
 
In the original EAN 2020 Vision model, the extension and communication of 
newly published results was to be a responsibility of local country teams and the RAC.  
The country teams had been built to include both researchers and senior government 
officials, so as to ensure from the start a narrowing of the research-to-policy gap.  This 
design worked well enough in Kenya, where the competitive grants program did produce 
some important research results (e.g., a study on animal health delivery systems in 
marginal areas that was published and reprinted and received wide attention throughout 
the region), but in the other countries of the Network the country teams found they had 
little new research to communicate.  Prior to its move into DSGD in 2003, the EAN’s 
most prominent policy communications efforts were two policy fora held in Ethiopia 
both focused on technology diffusion and grain-pricing policy.  In planning both of these 
fora, IFPRI’s Head of 2020 worked bilaterally with the Ethiopian Development Research 
Institute (EDRI), an organization well placed inside the office of the Prime Minister that 
was fortunately headed by the chair of Ethiopia’s country team.  The (commissioned) 
papers and summarized discussions from the first forum were promptly edited by IFPRI 
and EDRI, and then published in June 2002 as 2020 Vision NEA Report 1, with an 
accompanying policy brief.  A second EAN-sponsored grain pricing policy forum was 
held in Ethiopia in May 2003, with the same high-level attendance, more commissioned 
papers, and an even wider impact on the national policy debate.  Once again, 
backstopping from IFPRI headquarters was an essential ingredient to this policy 
communication success.  
 
                                                 
13 The first EAN Network Coordinator served formally from May 1, 1999, until May 14, 2002, 
but was inactive during the final six months of this service.  Later in 2002, a new Network Coordinator 
took over, but worked for most of his first year in Washington, DC, before outposting to Kampala in 
August 2003, by which time control of the network had been shifted out of 2020 and into DSGD.  Thus, 
for more than a year, there was no active Network Coordinator working in the region.    26
Was Local Ownership a Mistake in East Africa? 
 
The traffic grid design of the 2020 Vision East Africa Network was intended to 
ensure a great deal of local ownership.  In retrospect, it might have been better to provide 
more guidance and do more brokering at the IFPRI headquarters hub.  Many of the local 
country teams and researchers were not prepared to take the initiatives that would be 
required to utilize the competitive grants program effectively, and the links between these 
country teams never became robust.  The 2020 Vision EAN evolved quickly back into a 
hub-and-spoke operation with six relatively separate and autonomous country team 
spokes.  The country teams in Kenya and Ethiopia, the two higher capacity states in the 
region, were quite effective in developing country-level Network activities (a strong 
research program in Kenya, a strong policy forum process in Ethiopia), but the other four 
country teams were less successful in taking ownership of the initiative.  Particularly in 
Malawi and Mozambique, where local capacity and motivated leadership were both 
lacking, country teams lapsed into inactivity and the competitive grants program went 
under-utilized.  The 2020 Vision EAN was a modest research success at the country level 
in Kenya, and a clear policy communication success in Ethiopia, but elsewhere its 
strongest value came from its improvised capacity-building activities, and then from its 
role in conceptualizing a new collaborative effort to strengthen M.Sc. degree programs in 
agricultural economics in Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa.  
 
IFPRI also learned from its early East African network experience how difficult it 
can be to find and retain effective regional network coordinators.  These must be 
individuals with both strong scholarly credentials and superb managerial skills, and they 
must be able to rise above their national identity and bring the light personal touch 
needed to work equitably with a wide range of individuals and institutions across 
multiple borders.  These highly capable individuals must be willing to accept a posting in 
the region, rather than at IFPRI’s comfortable headquarters location in Washington, DC.  
If the remote location and the administrative demands of the job begin getting in the way 
of their own career advancement as researchers, these highly capable individuals can be 
expected to move on.  
 
The Policy Analysis and Advisory Network for South Asia (PAANSA) 
 
In January 2002, IFPRI launched its new South Asia Initiative (SAI).  This was a 
multidivisional effort within IFPRI led by the Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division 
(MTID) and the Communications Division (CD).  As one part of this initiative, IFPRI 
created the Policy Analysis and Advisory Network for South Asia (PAANSA).   There 
are six PAANSA countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) 
and a total of roughly 50 individual PAANSA members (21 from India, the largest 
country in the region; 9 from Bangladesh; 7 from Pakistan; 6 from Nepal; 4 from Sri 
Lanka; and 3 from Bhutan).  These network members have been chosen by IFPRI, and 
PAANSA is managed at IFPRI headquarters by the Director of MTID, a Senior Research 
Fellow in CD, and the South Asia Coordinator in MTID.  
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The PAANSA network in South Asia differs significantly from the original 2020 
Vision network in East Africa.  Whereas EAN was intended to function like a traffic grid 
with considerable local ownership, the research part of PAANSA operates more like a 
hub-and-spoke network, with management and most research initiatives led from IFPRI 
headquarters.  At the ends of its spokes, PAANSA does not have institutionalized country 
teams with designated chairs, coordinators, and a budget.  PAANSA only has individual 
members.  PAANSA has not tried to operate a local competitive research grants program, 
and for its first two years PAANSA did not even have a Network Coordinator posted to 
the region.  In countries where donor funding is available, PAANSA sponsors local and 
collaborative research primarily at the initiative of IFPRI headquarters, one project at a 
time.  In part because the PAANSA hub keeps such firm control, the local research 
sponsored within this network has been completed and published on schedule.  Compared 
to EAN, the PAANSA in South Asia has also been far more successful in sponsoring a 
wide range of events –– workshops, conferences, brainstorming sessions, policy 
dialogues, and publication projects –– that go beyond research.  These activities also 
follow the hub-and-spoke model, as they tend to be planned and managed from 
headquarters.  
 
Allocation of Research Tasks: PAANSA (2002–2004) 
 
Research Priority Setting:  Shared — IFPRI HQ (SAI) and local country 
teams 
Project Initiation and Design:  IFPRI HQ (SAI) 
Fundraising:  IFPRI HQ (SAI) 
Budget Allocation:  IFPRI HQ (SAI) 
Data Gathering:  Local researchers 
Data Analysis and Write-up:  Shared — Local researchers and IFPRI HQ 
(SAI) 
Final Review and Quality Control  IFPRI HQ (SAI) 
Publication:  IFPRI HQ (SAI) 
Extension of Published Results:  Shared — Local researchers and IFPRI HQ 
(SAI) 
 
Research Priority Setting 
 
In PAANSA, research priority setting is an informal and ongoing activity, shared 
between IFPRI headquarters and country team members in the region.  PAANSA’s first 
priority-setting exercise took place at a workshop attended by the new Indian members of 
the Network in January 2002.  The priorities identified at this meeting included a need to 
promote the role of the private sector in the procurement and distribution of agricultural 
commodities, the advance of institutional and pricing reforms for major agricultural input 
markets and input subsidies, and diversification into higher value agriculture for 
smallholders.  Three months later, a region-wide priority-setting exercise took place 
coincident with a joint conference between SAI and the Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations (ICRIER).  At this conference, PAANSA members 
from the region met, identified common themes, and agreed that the other individual   28
member countries in the region should hold their own consultative priority-setting 
meetings similar to the earlier Indian meeting.  By the end of 2003, PAANSA meetings 
had been held in five out of the six countries of the region; and in August 2003, SAI held 
a region-wide PAANSA conference, again in New Delhi.  At these and at numerous other 
meetings and workshops, research priority setting discussions were ongoing.  
 
Despite the widely participatory nature of these multiple priority-setting meetings, 
the IFPRI hub has clearly influenced the outcome, and the research themes finally 
established for PAANSA correspond closely to the themes earlier established at IFPRI 
headquarters for the larger SAI (e.g., national and regional market and trade policies, 
agricultural diversification, and agro-processing).  One impediment to effective bottom-
up priority setting has been earmarked donor funding.  Roughly 80 percent of the 
resources raised for PAANSA so far have been earmarked by for work in India, making it 
difficult for PAANSA to be responsive to locally generated research priorities in 
countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan.  PAANSA’s leadership continues to work at 
raising significant donor funds for Bangladesh and Pakistan, but as yet without success.  
PAANSA tries where it can to cross-subsidize under-funded countries through re-
allocations from over-funded countries, but the legal and political limits to this approach 
are obvious.  The disproportionate concentration of donor interest in India has prevented 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Bhutan from participating fully in many of the activities of 
PAANSA.  
 
Project Initiation and Design 
 
By the end of 2003, SAI had launched 14 research studies on various food 
security issues in India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, based on the priority-setting 
exercises undertaken during the PAANSA meetings.  PAANSA has no separate 
competitive grants program operated by its own members, so when research projects are 
launched within PAANSA they tend to be launched similar to other SAI research 
projects, at the initiative of headquarters.  Typically, IFPRI headquarters identifies key 
researchers then asks them to submit, for approval, a concept note within the frame of an 
already donor-approved project.  Because SAI/PAANSA has to rely on country-specific 
donor funding, as noted above, it has so far not been able to initiate research projects in 
countries, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, which have not enjoyed separately 
earmarked research support.  
 
SAI makes grants to individual researchers working at collaborating institutions 
in the region, often with the added inducement that these researchers will be able to 
spend a month or so as part of a “Visitor Exchange Program” working with counterparts 
at IFPRI headquarters.  For example, in the period from August 2002 to September 2003, 
seven researchers from the region visited IFPRI under this Visitor Exchange Program.  
Of these seven, six worked on collaborative projects with researchers at headquarters.  
PAANSA takes care on these collaborative projects to preserve lead authorship for 
researchers from the region, to facilitate the subsequent extension of research results in-
country and also to allay local suspicions about IFPRI headquarters exploiting local 
research talent.    29
 
Altogether in 2003, twelve SAI lead researchers visited IFPRI headquarters under 
this Exchange Program (eight from India, two from Nepal, and one each from Bhutan and 
Sri Lanka) to collaborate and present brown bag seminars on their respective research 
topics.  Indian domination of this program partly reflects India’s overwhelming size in 
the region (almost 3/4 of regional agriculture, population, and poverty), plus India’s 
popularity among donors (almost 80 percent of total SAI resources raised for research so 
far have been for work in India).  
 
Fundraising and Budget Allocation 
 
Fundraising and budget allocation in PAANSA are also headquarters functions.  
To support PAANSA and the Visitor Exchange Program, IFPRI has raised money from 
the Ford Foundation, USAID-Delhi, and USAID-ANE Bureau.  Other SAI activities, 
including training activities, have been funded by the Asian Development Bank, the EC, 
and the World Bank.  To date, donors have earmarked most research funding support for 
work in India, with much smaller amounts available for Sri Lanka and Nepal.  Donors 
promised to fund a project in Bhutan but then shifted resources to Pakistan.  Strenuous 
efforts by IFPRI headquarters persuade donors to fund Visitor Exchange researchers from 
Bangladesh and Pakistan have met repeated disappointment, and SAI was able to secure 
only training program support for these two PAANSA countries.  
 
Budget allocation for PAANSA has been through SAI at IFPRI headquarters.  In 
contrast to the 2020 Vision EAN, PAANSA through 2003 had no permanent 
administrative infrastructure in the field to make separate budget claims or take separate 
decisions on funding allocation.  SAI does not allocate funds to local country groups for 
fear of creating an impression of IFPRI as donor agency, rather than a policy research 
sponsor and collaborator.  In 2004, IFPRI announced its intent to hire a Research Fellow 
as part of the SAI, outposted at a new IFPRI office in New Delhi, and the creation of this 
local South Asia Office may help to decentralize the management of PAANSA.  A 
parallel payoff from this new regional office could be a more successful collaboration 
with other CGIAR centers, eight of which already have established regional or liaison 
offices housed within the same New Delhi complex.  
 
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Write-up 
 
Data gathering for SAI/PAANSA research projects is accomplished locally, as 
would be expected.  Yet the analysis and write-up of these projects has quite often been 
shared between local researchers and headquarters researchers as part of the Visitor 
Exchange Program.  The first research project to be completed under SAI/PAANSA 
sponsorship and through the Exchange Program, a study of “Implications of Domestic 
Deregulation and Reform under Liberalized Trade,” was originally presented in 2003 as 
an “IGIDR-IFPRI Collaborative Study,” but was later published as MTID Discussion 
Paper No. 67 in May 2004, with only the regional researchers listed as authors.  This was 
in keeping with IFPRI’s determination to reserve lead authorship for researchers from the 
region.    30
 
Final Review, Quality Control, and Publication 
 
Final review, quality control, and publication are also headquarters functions 
within PAANSA.  Research studies sponsored within SAI/PAANSA, when published as 
MTID Discussion Papers, are subject to the same significant and often-time consuming 
quality control procedures –– including external review –– used for other IFPRI 
Discussion Papers.
14  As PAANSA is still a young initiative (the first Visitor Exchange 
took place September–October 2002), the studies produced by these visitors are only just 
beginning to appear.  The first two MTID Discussion Papers to emerge from the 
PAANSA were published in May 2004.  
 
Extension of Published Results 
 
Research results specifically from the SAI/PAANSA Visitor Exchange Program 
are still so fresh that it is currently difficult to evaluate the manner in which they have 
been extended.  Yet SAI/PAANSA has already been extremely active in its efforts to 
communicate policy research within the region.  In 2003, SAI/PAANSA organized two 
“brainstorming sessions” in Bangladesh, nine meetings of one kind or another in India 
(brainstorming sessions, policy dialogues with officials, priority-setting workshops, 
international workshops), three events in Pakistan (including a meeting with the Planning 
Commission), and a workshop in Sri Lanka.  
 
Particularly within India, PAANSA has played an effective role in bringing 
together policy-oriented academics, planning commission members, and institute-based 
researchers to share information and exchange views on a regular basis.  PAANSA 
members explain that the key to this success has been strong leadership from IFPRI’s 
MTID Director, who was able to draw heavily on his own personal ties to top 
researchers, particularly in India, to secure quality participation in SAI and PAANSA 
events.  India’s 21 PAANSA members (which prior to 2004 included India’s current 
Prime Minister) are an unusually influential and illustrious group.  The seniority and 
visibility of these Indian Network members creates its own dilemma, however.  Will 
these top Indian members be willing to work through the somewhat more junior IFPRI 
Research Fellow now outposted to the new regional office in New Delhi, rather than 
continuing to communicate directly with the MTID Director at headquarters?  Given 
PAANSA’s history as a centralized hub-and-spoke system, it may be a challenge to 
establish a strong enough role for the new decentralized hub in New Delhi.  
 
Has PAANSA’s Hub-and-Spoke Design Been a Limitation? 
 
South Asia’s stronger local capacity, compared to East Africa, might have 
encouraged IFPRI to consider a spiderweb or even a traffic grid network for the region, 
                                                 
14 MTID describes its discussion papers as “containing preliminary material and research results, 
and are circulated prior to a full peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment.  It is 
expected that most Discussion Papers will eventually be published in some other form, and that their 
content may also be revised.”    31
yet PAANSA was created with a centralized hub-and-spoke design, with significant 
control over most research steps maintained by the SAI hub at IFPRI headquarters.  
IFPRI’s traffic grid design was too demanding for East Africa, but this highly centralized 
network design might seem not demanding enough for some countries in South Asia.  
Researchers in India might be capable of taking on more local ownership, in the form of a 
more autonomous country team perhaps with its own national work plan and budget, or 
even with its own nationally-operated competitive grants program.  
 
This alternative approach has been blocked by a combination of factors, including 
donor preferences (for centrally controlled research support), preferences among leading 
states in the region (PAANSA members in India are comfortable with the current model), 
and a preference within MTID itself not to move IFPRI in the direction of becoming a 
“donor” agency to local country teams.  India’s dominating presence in this region is 
another reason favoring centralization and a hub-and-spoke design.  If PAANSA had 
been designed as a spiderweb or as a traffic-grid network, most of the connections and 
hence most of the local brokering opportunities would probably have shifted even more 
toward India.  The centralized hub-and-spoke system gives IFPRI headquarters greater 
means to reallocate resources between countries and cross-subsidize where possible to 
move support to non-Indian recipients.  
 
Most PAANSA members in the region appear comfortable with the hub-and-
spoke approach.  Among non-Indians, it is valued as a hedge against single-country 
domination.  And among Indians as well it seems a comfortable way of working, since 
Indian researchers trust the MTID Director’s knowledge of the policy scene in India and 
his fairness in spreading around opportunities and responsibilities (e.g., for research 
contracts, workshop participation, invitations to IFPRI).  Indian PAANSA members seem 
almost glad that they do not have to argue among themselves over which PAANSA 
initiative will be taken next, which institute will co-host the next workshop, which 
researcher will get the next grant, or who will be invited next to visit IFPRI.  The 
centralization of brokering options implied by PAANSA’s structure might seem 
inappropriate to India’s more advanced stock of human capital, yet PAANSA members in 
India are not complaining.  They are already quite well connected to each other through 
their own personal networks, so they feel little need to take greater control over 
PAANSA.  For many Indians, PAANSA is valued mostly as a means to stay in closer 
touch with IFPRI headquarters, and the centralized network design is for this purpose 
seen as a plus.  
 
When pressed, some PAANSA members in India do raise questions about the 
sustainability of the present model.  One risk is that the SAI in general and PAANSA in 
particular will see its convening power decline over time if it continues to operate 
primarily as a sponsor of relatively small individual research projects, or as an organizer 
of workshops and training programs.  The individual research projects are valuable, but 
they tend to generate incremental and non-cumulative gains at the country level, rather 
than region-wide knowledge breakthroughs.  The workshops are valuable for the 
participants, and many of the papers presented at these workshops have been of high 
quality, but the new insights contained in these papers and the points of agreement that   32
emerge from the discussions are not being sufficiently captured and extended, and are 
thus also a bit fleeting and non-cumulative.
15  
 
One option for moving PAANSA’s research agenda beyond the small-project 
country-by-country approach would be to use the network’s hub-and-spoke capacity to 
design a centrally conceived research project with region-wide implications and 
applications.  For example, the SAI might develop a market model for the entire South 
Asia region, suitable for estimating both national and regional consequences of a South 
Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).  The model could then be shared through 
PAANSA with members in the region, for local use and extension.
16  The constraint here 
is one of donor funding preferences.  So long as the donor community remains wedded to 
imposing separate and individual country earmarks on policy research support, with so 
much of that support in South Asia going to India, the PAANSA network design 
alternatives available to IFPRI will be limited.  
 
DSGD Decentralization and Outreach Initiatives in Africa 
 
Since 2002, the new Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD) at 
IFPRI has also been pursuing a bold decentralization strategy, one that will eventually 
move half of this division’s senior staff into the field.
17  Yet “regional networks” are only 
one feature of DSGD’s decentralization and outreach design.  Outposted staff are also 
being assigned to work closely with non-regional and non-network organizations, and 
with policymakers and researchers at the national level, within individual focus countries.  
The program of these outposted IFPRI staff will be driven by a larger vision that 
combines cross-country analysis, country case studies, and a development and provision 
of “strategic analysis and knowledge support systems” (SAKSS).  One purpose of the 
                                                 
15 In order to capture and build more effectively on insights that emerge from the regional 
workshops, SAI might assign to a respected researcher the task of preparing for each workshop a 
“synthesis paper” that would report briefly on the most important conclusions that emerged from workshop 
papers and discussions.  This would be more than just a “rapporteur’s summary,” as it would be authored 
by a senior researcher capable of synthesizing and extracting new analytic insights from the substantive 
materials of the workshop.  These synthesis papers could then be posted on a PAANSA website (or on a 
PAANSA link on IFPRI’s website).  The goal would be to provide the wider research and policy 
community with a more cumulative and durable record of SAI/PAANSA work in the region.  
16 As governments in the region move toward SAFTA, there will be a need for quantified 
estimates of the probable impacts within various commodity markets and farm input markets (fertilizer, 
machinery, pesticides, seeds) under different free trade scenarios.  Such a regional market model would be 
challenging to construct, given data gaps in some of the countries of the region (albeit not in India) and 
given the high volume of illicit and hence already duty-free trade currently taking place (illegal trade in the 
region is currently estimated to be twice the volume of official trade).  Yet currently there is not even a 
crude form of such a regional market model available to help researchers and policy makers respond to 
questions, criticisms, and (often unfounded) fears regarding SAFTA. Some PAANSA members in India 
believe that such a model is certain to be developed sooner or later, and that it would be better if a credible 
independent institute such as IFPRI did the job, and then offered access to users in the region as a public 
good, rather than seeing results emerge only from the less transparent models that may eventually be 
developed entirely within government ministries.  
17 Most of the depictions of the DSGD approach presented here are taken from “IFPRI’s Agenda 
for Contributing to Improved Development Strategy,” April 2004.    33
cross-country analysis will be to develop more useful techniques for classifying the 
development circumstances of countries, to match them with appropriate policy 
strategies.  The country case studies (to be carried out in the focus countries) will help 
IFPRI develop more practical frameworks and decision tools to support policy decisions 
and test the effectiveness of different policy mixes in countries with different 
characteristics.  DGSD will then be able to develop and deliver SAKSS, the packages of 
analytic tools and accompanying data bases that will help officials make informed policy 
choices.  These packages will be developed as dynamic multi-purpose instruments, with 
monitoring and evaluation systems to measure progress, analytic tools and data bases 
subject to regular update, and close links to ongoing training and capacity-building work.  
 
Eastern and Southern African Regional Networks  
 
DSGD’s initial intent had been to build a substantial part of its outreach effort 
around multi-tier regional networks, not only in Eastern and Southern Africa, but in 
Central America as well.  It was originally envisioned that these networks might be 
similar across regions and structured in two tiers, with a first tier of senior policymakers 
who would be the primary users of network services and would identify priority cross-
cutting regional issues for research and dialogue, then a second tier of national 
researchers who would be expected to undertake research at the country level and report 
back to the first tier.  The membership of the country research teams was to have 
remained fluid, as groups of researchers could be joined together, and then dissolves as 
different tasks were taken on and completed.  
 
These envisioned DSGD regional networks were going to be hub-and-spoke in 
design, to avoid an overburdening of local capacity.  In some cases these networks would 
be created from scratch, and elsewhere partnerships would be formed with pre-existing 
regional networks.  In East Africa this implied a shift away from the ambitious traffic 
grid approach of the 2020 Vision network, with fewer responsibilities placed on IFPRI’s 
own country teams in the region and more partnering with an existing policy network, the 
Eastern and Central African Program for Agricultural Policy Analysis (ECAPAPA) in 
Entebbe.
18  ECAPAPA has its own competitive research grants program, it receives 
considerable support from a number of donors including IDRC, SDC, and USAID, and as 
an organization it has been growing stronger and taking on a broader range of issues.  
ECAPAPA values a link to IFPRI because its own autonomous policy analysis capacity 
remains limited.  DSGD, for its part, hopes a closer link to ECAPAPA can give strength 
to IFPRI’s own East Africa Network, which began holding new rounds of country team 
meetings in 2004 to redefine its purposes and programs.  
 
Partnering with existing regional networks is a strategy DSGD also considered in 
southern Africa.  In this region, DSGD initially considered partnering with a network 
recently created within the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Food, 
                                                 
18 ECAPAPA is a program of ASARECA, the Association for Strengthening Agricultural 
Research in Eastern and Central Africa, which covers 10 countries: Burundi, D.R. Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.    34
Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN), based in 
Harare.
19  FANRPAN was a hub and spoke network with a small secretariat that worked 
through designated contact points (“nodes”) located within existing research institutions 
(mostly donor-funded think tanks) in separate member countries.  In November 2002, 
IFPRI signed a memorandum of understanding with FANRPAN to undertake joint 
research and capacity-strengthening activities in the Southern African region.  In March 
2003, IFPRI partnered with FANRPAN, and also with the Famine Early Warning System 
(FEWS NET), to organize a regional policy dialogue in Botswana on agricultural 
recovery, food security, and trade policies in Southern Africa; and in April 2003, IFPRI 
and FANRPAN convened a two-day meeting in Johannesburg, to launch a regional 
policy dialogue on Biotechnology, Agriculture, and Food Security in Southern Africa.
20  
 
IFPRI’s larger strategy was to build a partnership with FANRPAN that would 
attract more funding to this young and struggling network organization.  In May 2003, 
IFPRI drafted a concept note to the donor community, laying out a vision of an initial 
three-year partnership with FANRPAN, to be managed from IFPRI through a senior staff 
member outposted to FANRPAN, supported by a “non-executive” Regional Advisory 
Committee.
21  This effort fell short when neither USAID nor DFID agreed to provide the 
needed budget support.  If it had gone forward, this DSGD/FANRPAN research network 
in Southern Africa would have built on FANRPAN’s a hub-and-spoke system, through a 
partnership between FANRPAN’s secretariat and IFPRI’s outposted senior staff member 
in the region.  
 
DSGD’s effort to build this partnership with FANRPAN began with the 
development of five regional research priorities, developed at the policy dialogue 
conference in Botswana in March 2003.
22  These five cross-cutting research themes were 
to be the building blocks for subsequent national and regional research initiatives.  IFPRI 
envisioned a collaborative program in the region consisting of roughly five larger 
projects per year (one per cross-cutting research theme, $48,000 each) and 10 smaller 
projects per year (two per research theme, $8,000 each).  The initiation and design of 
these projects would come from IFPRI, but the hub of the network would be IFPRI’s 
senior staff member outposted in the region, working with the FANRPAN secretariat and 
                                                 
19 Eight SADC countries are currently members of FANRPAN: Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
20 This was the first in an integrated series of participatory multi-stakeholder roundtable 
discussions responding to the 2002–03 food emergency in Southern Africa, addressing specifically the role 
of GM crops and food aid.  These discussions were strategically linked to the work of a Biotechnology 
Advisory Committee recently created by the SADC Council of Ministers for food, agriculture, and natural 
resources (SADC-FANR) and with a proposed NEPAD African Panel on Biotechnology (APB).  
21 “Achieving Food Security in Southern Africa through Strengthened Capacity for Food Policy 
Research, Analysis, Dialogue, and Implementation,” a concept note for a regional research, capacity 
strengthening, and outreach program submitted to the Department for International Development by IFPRI, 
May 2003.  
22The five priorities: agricultural science and technology policy to strengthen farm production for 
food security; improved governance of food reserves; making food market liberalization work for the poor; 
regional and global market integration; and food insecurity vulnerability assessment and monitoring, for 
crisis response.    35
supported by a local RAC.  The presence of this IFPRI hub in the region was to have 
facilitated local fundraising as well.  The goal was to work through FANRPAN’s hub-
and-spoke network design at the outset, then move where possible toward more and more 
local ownership.  
 
FANRPAN was a young organization with a small secretariat that had been 
established only in 2001, and IFPRI knew additional donor funding would be needed to 
make its partnership design work.  When these funds could not be raised in 2004, the 
plan was put aside.  
 
IFPRI’s Link to NEPAD  
 
In 2004, IFPRI found a more promising venue for outreach activities in Africa by 
outposting a Senior Research Advisor to quite a different local organization: the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).  NEPAD cannot be described as a 
regional network; it is an Africa-wide initiative created in 2002 in part to give donors 
among the G8 countries and African governments an alternative venue to the African 
Union (AU) for coordinating development assistance initiatives.
23  Within Africa, 
NEPAD has been most strongly championed by Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria 
and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, as an alternative to the AU which has been strongly 
influenced recently by the oil-rich but mistrusted Mohmmar Qadaffi of Libya.  NEPAD 
is organized around a Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee 
(HSGIC) Chaired by President Obasanjo, a Steering Committee, and a Secretariat.  In the 
area of food and agriculture, NEPAD has launched a Comprehensive African 
Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) initially consisting of just principles and 
goals, but soon to become a draft implementation roadmap intended to provide a coherent 
framework to coordinate external assistance to African countries.
24  
 
Two years after its founding, NEPAD continues to hold the attention of the donor 
community and a number of top African leaders, so it gives IFPRI a high-powered setting 
in which to extend policy research results.
25  In August 2003, IFPRI signed of a 
memorandum of understanding with NEPAD to facilitate cooperation; and, in May 2004, 
a senior DSGD researcher was outposted to Pretoria as a Senior Research Advisor to 
NEPAD’s Technical Secretariat to assist in the process of moving from the CAADP 
                                                 
23 In November 2003, Professor Welshman Nkhulu (the South African chairperson of the NEPAD 
Steering Committee with whom the CGIAR has signed its MOUs) proposed legal separation from the AU 
Secretariat in Addis.  Nkhulu said he wanted NEPAD to be able to cut across Africa’s system of Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) such as SADC and ECOWAS, and remain flexible enough to lead in the 
interface with donors and multilateral lending institutions.  This proposal was seen by some at the AU as a 
challenge to the authority of its own secretariat and as threat to the regional economic integration plans 
envisioned in the AU Constitutive Act.  
24 Communique: 10
th Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation 
Committee (HSGIC), Maputo, Mozambique, 23 May 2004 (http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000825/index.php).  
25 One of NEPAD’s innovations has been to create an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
for assessing and critiquing the governance of individual African states.  The APRM, designed in part to 
reassure donors that assistance funds will be well spent, conducted its first government performance review 
in Ghana in May 2004.    36
framework document to actual implementation of the program.  With IFPRI’s support, 
the Agricultural Unit of the Secretariat has now translated CAADP priorities and themes 
into a finite set of major agricultural development programs and initiatives, a strategic 
roadmap to guide the Secretariat’s implementation efforts.  IFPRI has begun carrying out 
joint missions with the Secretariat to discuss financial support from the G8 governments 
and from multilateral development organizations, and is providing regular support to the 
Secretariat’s semi-annual African Partnership Forum meetings with the G8 partners to 
review implementation.  
 
This new IFPRI link to NEPAD is a further step toward decentralization and 
outreach, but not in a “regional networking” mode, since NEPAD is an all-Africa 
organization, and more of a formal network between Africans and donors than an 
informal network just among Africans.  IFPRI’s link to the NEPAD Secretariat in 
Pretoria provides local networking opportunities within South Africa itself, but does not 
provide IFPRI with a substitute for the Southern African regional network that was 
envisioned with FANRPAN.  The challenge for IFPRI will be to find appropriate 
research products it can bring to the table in support of the CAADP, while working in 
cooperation with the other research organizations designated to support NEPAD, such as 
the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).
26  FARA, like so many 




Focus Country Initiatives 
 
A final decentralization initiative by DSGD in Africa has been the creation of 
Country Strategy Support Programs in individual focus countries in the region.  The first 
and best developed program so far is in Ethiopia, a second program has been launched in 
Uganda, and candidate focus countries are being identified in West Africa as well.  
Donor interest in country-level support programs has been high, facilitating a rapid 
expansion of this bilateral in-country work.  IFPRI hopes this work at the individual 
country level will supplement rather than compete with its parallel efforts at regional 
networking.  The country-level approach cannot possibly be followed in all 47 countries 
of the region, but some kinds of policy research done well at the country level can later 
be extended regionally, including through regional networks.  
 
In Ethiopia, the new Support Program is designed to work as a partnership with 
the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), the same organization inside the 
office of the Prime Minister that earlier planned successful policy forums through the 
2020 Vision EAN.  Ethiopia has always preferred to maintain a bilateral rather than a 
                                                 
26 “CGIAR Strengthens its Partnership with NEPAD,” CGIAR NEWS, June 2004, p. 10.  
27 In 1997, the sub regional organizations (SROs) in Africa and the Special Program for 
Agriculture in Africa (SPAAR) decided to form FARA during the SPAAR plenary in Mali.  In 1999, 
SPAAR started acting as FARA’s secretariat but, during the African Agricultural Research week in 2000 in 
Guinea, there was consensus to replace SPAAR with FARA.  SPAAR, therefore, started the transition 
process in 2001 to 2002 with the help of ISNAR.  By July 2002, the FARA secretariat was fully 
functioning and it is currently hosted by the FAO Regional Office for Africa in Accra, Ghana.    37
regionalized relationship with IFPRI, and Addis has now become a more important 
decentralization hub for IFPRI, with the establishment of IFPRI’s new ISNAR division in 
April 2004 at the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) campus in Addis.  
 
IFPRI’s next step might be to initiate focus country work in West Africa as well, 
in Ghana, Nigeria, or perhaps Senegal.  This could be done as a supplement to regional 
networking in West Africa, but the original 2020 Vision initiative considered creation of 
a West African Network (WAN) and at that time donors were only willing to fund a 
network in the east.  If it cannot fund its own regional network from scratch, IFPRI could 
alternatively seek donor support for a partnership with an existing regional organization, 
such as the ECOWAS secretariat in Nigeria.
28  This model would be roughly parallel to 
IFPRI’s current East Africa regional network strategy of partnering with ECAPAPA.  
 
                                                 
28 ECOWAS is the Economic Community of West African States, a regional group of 15 countries 
founded in 1975.  Its expansive mission has been to promote economic integration in “all fields of 
economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial matters, social and cultural issues…” — in other words, 
everything.    38
 
6.  LESSONS FROM IFPRI’S EXPERIENCE 
 
 
IFPRI has made several attempts to create or use regional networks in pursuit of 
its decentralization objectives.  The record has been mixed, and for understandable 
reasons.  IFPRI’s work focuses increasingly on South Asia and Africa, where weak and 
uneven local capacities, poor coordination between multiple donor-funded institutions, 
and rivalries among countries have all tended to impede optimal regional network 
operations.  
 
In South Asia, regional network operations have been a challenge because of 
donor reluctance to provide balanced funding among the states in the region.  India’s 
dominating size has thus been reinforced by a dominating donor focus on India, making 
IFPRI’s efforts to fund of region-wide work through PAANSA more difficult.  The hub-
and-spoke design of the PAANSA was perhaps the best way to manage this difficulty, as 
it allows the IFPRI hub to cross-subsidize the non-Indian members of PAANSA to some 
extent.  PAANSA is now in the process of moving more of the IFPRI hub from 
headquarters out to the field, but this by itself may not build more regionality into the 
network.  It thus might be in order to introduce more multi-country and region-wide 
themes into the network’s research agenda.  The policy challenge of SAFTA could serve 
as one such theme in the future.  
 
In Africa, IFPRI’s regional network efforts have struggled because of low donor 
support, low and uneven capacity among the dozens of countries on the continent, and 
also for political reasons (sub-regional groupings of states are sometimes seen as 
unwelcome efforts by donors, or by dominant states, to “divide Africa”).  Regional and 
sub-regional institutions in Africa often have weak secretariats, large memberships, little 
reliable interface with each other, as well as little proven influence over the actual 
policies of national governments.  These regional institutions may accurately reflect the 
aspirations of many Africans to build greater continental integration, yet regionalization 
and sub-regionalization efforts in Africa have also to some extent been donor-driven.  
Institutions and initiatives that aggregate African states give donors a more convenient 
way to manage assistance programs on the continent, without a need to have separate 
representation in each individual African country.  This kind of donor-sponsored 
regionalization has not always been a mistake, but it should only be undertaken when it is 
a convenience to Africans as well as donors.  
 
IFPRI’s regional networking efforts in Africa have not always been perfectly 
tailored to navigate such challenges.  In the original 2020 Vision EAN, an ambitiously 
decentralized traffic grid network was mandated for a region that barely had the capacity 
to work through a hub-and-spoke system.  More recent DSGD efforts to decentralize into 
Africa have tried to learn from this experience.  In East Africa, DSGD moved back a 
step, and is now relying more heavily on a partnership with an existing regional policy 
network, ECAPAPA.  In Southern Africa, DSGD did attempt to design a regional   39
network partnership with FANRPAN, but the needed donor support for this effort was 
not forthcoming.  The strongest forward steps taken by IFPRI toward decentralization 
into Africa have not been through regional networks at all.  Instead, IFPRI has outposted 
senior staff to form productive relationships with individual African-country 
governments, and also with an all-African partnership initiative between donors and 
governments, NEPAD.  
 
In Africa, IFPRI appears to have been moving by trial and error away from 
strategies based primarily on regional networks, and instead toward strategies heavily 
grounded in bilateral relationships with key focus countries, as with the Country Strategy 
Support Program in Ethiopia.  In low capacity countries where donor funds are available, 
such as Ethiopia, working bilaterally in-country emerges as the most promising 
decentralization strategy.  IFPRI’s greatest institutional challenge has always been to 
bridge the research-to-policy gap, and the probability of bridging this gap goes up when 
IFPRI staff are outposted closer and closer to policymakers at the national level.  
Creating or trying to work through an intermediate layer of regional networks may only 
widen the gap between IFPRI’s researchers and these final decisionmakers within 
national governments.  Working at the national level is always risky for IFPRI, because it 
can require staff to make specific policy recommendations and then take at least partial 
responsibility for the outcome.  Yet in the past, some of IFPRI’s highest payoff work has 
been accomplished at the national level.
29  
 
Increased bilateral efforts at the country level are not a rejection of networking as 
such.  Local Country Strategy Support Program offices can in fact become good 
mechanisms for linking IFPRI to some of the most powerful non-regional networks that 
currently operate to shape policy, including in-country networks among international 
donors, among donors and NGOs, and local political networks between governments and 
civil society.  All such networks must be engaged in any case if difficult policy decisions 
are to be taken, funded, and implemented.  
 
IFPRI’s experience so far also tends to confirm the hypothesis that regional 
network creation will be especially difficult in low capacity regions.  In regions such as 
Africa, highly centralized hub-and-spoke networks may remain the only viable design, 
pending a buildup of local human capital.  Donor investments to build local human 
capital may be a more urgent need in these regions than still more policy networks.  The 
original 2020 Vision network effort in East Africa acknowledged this reality when it 
spun off a new collaborative effort to mobilize more donor funding for masters degree 
training in agricultural economics in Africa.  In low capacity regions, policy research 
networks (both formal and informal) operate best within countries: among government 
officials, universities, think tanks, donor representatives, and NGOs.  To engage these 
important intranational networks IFPRI should not be afraid to conduct more of its 
                                                 
29 For example, IFPRI’s work with Viet Nam in 1995–97 led to rice policy changes that proved 
within four years to be worth more than $60 million dollars to Viet Nam’s economy.  James G. Ryan, 
“Assessing the Impact of Rice Policy Changes in Viet Nam and the Contribution of Policy Research,” 
Impact Assessment Discussion Paper No. 8 (Washington, DC: IFPRI, January 1999).  
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research efforts through country strategy offices.  Decentralization is important for 
IFPRI, and networking is important, but neither objective should be attempted 
exclusively through regional networks.  
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